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ABSTRACT
In the wake of Bernard Madoff’s $65 billion Ponzi scheme and the
recent economic crisis stemming largely from loosely regulated
subprime lending and mortgage-backed securities, President Obama
signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act on July 21, 2010, signaling loudly and clearly that change is
coming to Wall Street. But Wall Street is not the only one receiving
a message. Buried deep within the 2,319 pages of the Dodd-Frank
Act, companies can find Section 922, the whistleblower provision,
which provides a bounty for whistleblowers who report securities
violations to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
These bounty provisions and the subsequent rules implementing
them have been criticized by many as ineffective and unnecessarily
intrusive on established internal compliance programs. In light of
these criticisms, this Article analyzes the Dodd-Frank bounty
program and its likely effect on corporate internal compliance
programs, relying largely upon literature and studies in the areas of
behavioral economics, organizational behavior and business ethics
relating to whistleblowing. The authors argue that rather than
undermining internal compliance programs, the Dodd-Frank bounty
program will serve as a much-needed check on poorly administered
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internal compliance programs that are not adequately policing fraud
and unethical behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of Bernard Madoff’s $65 billion Ponzi scheme and the
recent economic crisis stemming largely from loosely regulated
subprime lending and mortgage-backed securities, President Obama
signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank”) on July 21, 2010, signaling loudly and clearly that
change is coming to Wall Street.1 But Wall Street is not the only one
receiving a message. Buried deep within the 2,319 pages of the DoddFrank Act, companies can find Section 922, the whistleblower
provision.2 This provision rewards individuals who assist the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in uncovering any securities
violations.3 Section 922 requires the SEC to pay whistleblowers a cash
bounty ranging from ten to thirty percent of any “monetary sanctions,”4
including settlements, in excess of $1 million that the government
recovers through civil or criminal proceedings as a result of the
whistleblower’s assistance.5
Given the enormous size of recent settlements and fines for
violations of securities laws, the potential payouts under these
whistleblower provisions can be quite lucrative. One such area of
securities law that has recently seen some staggering settlements and
fines is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), an act that
prohibits bribes to foreign government officials.6 In 2010, for example,

1. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78o-11); Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2010, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/
22regulate.html.
2. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(b).
3. Id.
4. Id. § 922(a)(4). The term “monetary sanctions” is defined as any of the
following that are derived from any judicial or administrative action: (1) any monies,
(penalties, disgorgement, and interest) ordered to be paid; and (2) any monies deposited
into a disgorgement fund or another fund pursuant to Section 308(b) of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 as a result of such action or any settlement of such action.
5. Id. § 922(b)(1).
6. Titan Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), 16 n.8, (Nov. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.secinfo.com/dVut2.11Z1e.htm (In 2004 Titan Corporation was penalized
$28.5 million); SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 21592,
2010 SEC LEXIS 2288 (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litr
eleases/2010/lr21592.htm; SEC Charges KBR and Halliburton for FCPA Violations,
SEC Press Release No. 2009-23 (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
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FCPA enforcement activity rose to such a high level that fear of FCPA
liability became ubiquitous in the business community due to record
levels of enforcement actions, industry-wide investigations, prosecutions
of individuals and international anti-corruption cooperation.7 The
dynamic duo, the SEC and Department of Justice (“DOJ”), dwarfed the
level of enforcement activity from any prior year in the FCPA’s thirtythree year history.8 Additionally, because of criticism from a perceived
lack of enforcement in the period preceding the recent financial crisis,
the SEC has become more aggressive in pursuing enforcement actions
for traditional securities law violations as well.9 Against this
background, Dodd-Frank’s guaranteed financial incentives coupled with
its fortified anti-retaliation provisions will likely turn the heat up for
both multinational and domestic companies. This potential for a large
press/2009/2009-23.htm (stating that a record settlement was reached in 2008 involving
Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc. and its parent company Halliburton Co. in which both
companies agreed to pay a $402 million fine to the DOJ as well as $177 million in
disgorgement of profits to the SEC based on allegations of bribery of Nigerian officials
over a ten-year period); SEC Charges Baker Hughes with Foreign Bribery and with
Violating 2001 Commission Cease-and-Desist Order, SEC Press Release No. 2007-77
(Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-77.htm ($44
million settlement with Baker Hughes, Inc. in 2007); Siemens AG and Three
Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to
Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 15, 2008),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html (In 2008, the DOJ, the
SEC, and German authorities settled an enforcement action against the German
electronics and engineering tycoon Siemens AG, along with its subsidiaries located in
Argentina, Bangladesh, and Venezuela. The criminal fines, penalties, and disgorged
profits totaled more than $1.6 billion and now constitute the largest settlement in the
history of the FCPA. The DOJ also assessed a criminal penalty of $448.5 million on
Siemens AG and $500,000 on the implicated subsidiaries. Additionally, the SEC
required Siemens AG to disgorge more than $350 million in profits to settle a related
civil complaint.).
7. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE 1–3 (2011),
available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010YearEndFCP
AUpdate.pdf; see also Bethany Hengsbach, Proposed Whistleblower Provision Could
Dramatically Increase FCPA Risk, GOVCON (May 12, 2010), http://www.government
contractslawblog.com/2010/05/articles/fcpa/proposed-whistleblower-provision-coulddramatically-increase-fcpa-risk/ (stating that in just the first few months of 2010 alone,
the government collected $1.2 billion in FCPA sanctions).
8. GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER LLP, supra note 7, at 1.
9. See Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Pursuing More Cases Tied to Financial Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 2010, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/business
/21sec.html.
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financial reward has created in the minds of many compliance
professionals a fear of widespread and opportunistic whistleblowing.
These whistleblower provisions and the subsequent rules
implementing them10 have been criticized by many as ineffective and
unnecessarily intrusive on established internal compliance programs.
Some believe that these existing internal compliance programs can be
quite successful in deterring fraud and should not be undermined.11 In
light of these criticisms, this Article analyzes the Dodd-Frank bounty
program and its likely effect on corporate internal compliance programs
and internal employee reporting. This Article will particularly rely upon
literature and studies in the areas of behavioral economics,
organizational behavior and business ethics. Part I briefly outlines
relevant bounty programs and whistleblower laws to illustrate how the
Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions are properly engineered to churn
out tips. Part II reviews the specific structure of these whistleblower
provisions and eligibility requirements for obtaining a reward. Part III
discusses the criticisms of these provisions, and specifically how the
provisions conflict with internal compliance programs. Part III will also
answer these criticisms and make specific recommendations on how to
structure and implement internal compliance programs in order to
maximize internal reporting in light of these whistleblower provisions.
Finally, Part IV offers concluding remarks.

10. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-64545, 2011 SEC LEXIS 1816 (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter
Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions].
11. See, e.g., Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Provisions, 6 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 132 (2011); see also
U.S. Chamber Warns New SEC Whistleblower Rule Will Undermine Corporate
Compliance Programs, PRESS RELEASES, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMM. (May 25, 2011),
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2011/may/us-chamber-warns-new-sec-whis.
tleblower-rule-will-undermine-corporate-complia
(“In
approving
this
new
whistleblower rule, the SEC has chosen to put trial lawyer profits ahead of effective
compliance and corporate governance. This rule will make it harder and slower to
detect and stop corporate fraud—by undermining the strong compliance systems set up
under Sarbanes Oxley to ensure companies take whistleblowers seriously. Armed with
trial lawyers and new large financial incentives to bypass these programs,
whistleblowers will go straight to the SEC with allegations of wrongdoing and keep
companies in the dark. This leaves expensive, robust compliance programs collecting
dust, while violations continue to fester, eroding shareholder value.”) [hereinafter U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMM.].
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I. THE BOUNTY MODEL
Understanding how the structure of the Dodd-Frank bounty
program can significantly increase tips and enforcement actions begins
with understanding the program’s design and its roots. For more than
140 years, federal agencies have benefited from bounty programs in
some form or fashion.12 Under a bounty scheme, a private informant
may receive a percentage of any penalties the government recovers from
legal action taken based on the proffered information. Under such
schemes, the government is essentially partnering up with private
citizens in enforcing a particular law.
In spite of the alleged economic efficiencies of bounty programs,
some believe they create perverse incentives and should be repealed on
ethical and policy grounds.13 The reasoning is simple—the financial
incentives of reporting are oftentimes fueled by greed or revenge. This
situation may result in snitching against fellow associates, employers,
relatives and even family members.14 Senator Reid of Nevada best
captured this philosophy during a 1998 congressional debate when he
labeled the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) whistleblower program a
“[r]eward for rats.”15
As noted by Professors Ferziger and Currell, despite the potential
moral hazards of bounty schemes, they survive for one reason—they
work.16 The bounty model is a win-win system. These programs allow
the government to recover billions of dollars annually that it could not
have recovered otherwise without the information provided by
informants, and in return, the government agencies pay out millions in
bounties.17 But not all federal bounty programs are the same, and not all
programs have achieved the same results. A comparative analysis of
several bounty and plain-vanilla whistleblower programs demonstrates
12. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 7, 14 Stat. 471, 473 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 7623 (2006)).
13. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S4397 (1998) (statement of Sen. Reid).
14. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Ex-Wife Gets $1 Million in Payment over Pequot
Case, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870.
3294904575385551259982316.html.
15. 144 CONG. REC. S4397 (1998) (statement of Sen. Reid).
16. See Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The
Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
1141, 1143.
17. See id.
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why the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision will most likely do what it
was created to do—generate tips.
A. SHOW ME THE MONEY:
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
The False Claims Act (“FCA”) authorizes private citizens to bring
qui tam actions18 on behalf of the federal government against any person
who defrauds the federal government.19 Under the FCA, the government
has the right to intervene in a qui tam suit.20 If the government
intervenes, it is primarily responsible for conducting the litigation, but
the qui tam plaintiff remains a party to the suit.21 The most important
feature of the FCA is that it entitles the qui tam plaintiff to at least
fifteen percent and up to thirty percent of any amounts recovered,
depending on how much the plaintiff contributed to the litigation and
whether the government intervened.22
The FCA’s mandatory reward of at least fifteen percent and a
maximum recovery of up to double that amount plays an integral part in
the stockpiles of cash handed out to informants each year.23 In 2009
alone, the United States government obtained $2.4 billion from FCA
cases, the second-highest recovery amount in history.24 Of that $2.4
billion, about $2 billion was recovered in lawsuits filed under the FCA’s
bounty program.25 The whistleblowers received a hefty $255 million in
18. Qui tam is the Latin abbreviation for the Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro se ipso,” which means “he who pursues this action on our Lord the
King’s behalf as well as his own.” 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM
ACTIONS 1–7 (3d ed. 2007). Qui tam actions have their origins in the courts of Ancient
Rome. Qui tam actions flourished under the common law and statutes of England
during the Middle Ages and were transported to the American colonies and later into
American law. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating
Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U.
L. REV. 91, 96 n.19 (2007).
19. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2006); see also id. § 3730(b)(1) (authorizing qui
tam actions).
20. Id. § 3730(b)(4).
21. Id. § 3730(c).
22. Id. § 3730(d).
23. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Recovers $2.4
Billion in False Claims Cases in 2009; More than $24 Billion Since 1986, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-civ1253.html.
24. See id.
25. See id.
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awards.26 These unparalleled numbers demonstrate that whistleblowers
will not shy away from huge financial incentives to tattle.
B. A FLURRY OF TIPS: THE IRS’S 2006
AMENDMENT TO THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM
In 2006, Congress amended the IRS whistleblower program to
strengthen the IRS’s ability to pay rewards to tax whistleblowers.27
Now, like the FCA-model, the IRS whistleblower provisions require the
IRS to pay between fifteen and thirty percent28 of collected proceeds in
disputes where the information substantially contributes to a decision to
take administrative or judicial action. In order to qualify for a bounty, if
the action is brought against an individual taxpayer, their gross income
for any taxable year subject to the action must exceed $200 thousand
annually.29 Additionally, the total amount collected in the action must
exceed $2 million.30
Comparing the tips accrued in 2007 with those accrued in 2008
shows that the new amendment is fulfilling its intended purpose. In
2007, the IRS received eighty-three claims alleging a total underreported
income of $8 billion.31 In 2008, the IRS received 1,890 claims alleging a
total underreported income of $65 billion.32 Because it takes years under
the IRS bounty program to issue the bounty, it is difficult to assess how
the massive influx of tips will affect actual enforcement.33 Despite this
uncertainty, supporters of the IRS bounty program point to the billions
of dollars in tax revenue the IRS stands to gain under the program.34
26.
27.

See id.
See generally Tax Relief & Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432,
§ 406(d), 120 Stat. 2922, 2958 (codified at I.R.C. § 7623 (2006)).
28. I.R.C. § 7623 (b)(1).
29. Id. § 7623(b)(5)(A).
30. Id. § 7623(b)(5)(B).
31. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
DEFICIENCIES EXIST IN THE CONTROL AND TIMELY RESOLUTION OF WHISTLEBLOWER
CLAIMS 6 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2009reports
/200930114fr.pdf.
32. See id.
33. David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blowers Become Investment Option for Hedge
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/0
5/20/business/20whistleblower.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.
34. See Erika A. Kelton, To Catch a Tax Cheat, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/07/opinion/07iht-edkelton.4.15087010.html.
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C. MISSING THE MARK:
THE INSIDER TRADING ACT
Exploring a bounty program that lacks a mandatory payout
provision sheds light on how much a guarantee of financial reward can
influence a whistleblower’s decision. The Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (“Insider Trading Act”) authorizes the
SEC to pay a bounty of up to ten percent of penalties imposed in insider
trading cases.35 Despite the program’s lifespan of over twenty years, the
SEC has only paid a meager $159,537 to a total of five claimants.36 In
explaining these poor statistics, the Inspector General noted that the
bounty program “is not fundamentally well-designed to be successful.”37
There are several arguable explanations for the failure of the Insider
Trading Act’s bounty program. First, with regard to the potential bounty
payout, the Insider Trading Act’s ten percent cap falls considerably
below the fifteen to thirty percent reward available under the FCA and
the IRS plans.38 This decreased financial incentive eliminates or at the
very least discourages a large class of motivated whistleblowers.39
Second, the SEC’s ability to limit its rewards to penalties imposed under
the Insider Trading Act further underscores this reward gap. In
comparison, the FCA permits a qui tam litigant to recover a share of any
settlements rather than just penalties imposed.40 Finally, the rewards
35. See generally Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3, 102 Stat. 4677, 4677 (1988) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78u-1).
36. See H. DAVID KOTZ, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY PROGRAM 5 (2010), available at http://www.secoig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2010/474.pdf.
37. Id.
38. See discussion supra Part I.A-B.
39. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2002), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
923(b)(2)(b) (2010) (“[T]here shall be paid from amounts imposed as a penalty under
this section and recovered by the Commission or the Attorney General, such sums, not
to exceed 10 percent of such amounts . . . to the person or persons who provide
information leading to the imposition of such penalty.”), with I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1)
(2006) (“If the Secretary proceeds with any administrative or judicial action . . . based
on information brought to the Secretary’s attention by an individual, such individual
shall . . . receive as an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30 percent of the
collected proceeds . . . .”).
40. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (amended 2010) (“[T]here shall be paid from
amounts imposed as a penalty under this section and recovered by the Commission or
the Attorney General, such sums, not to exceed 10 percent of such amounts, as the
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under the Insider Trading Act are entirely discretionary with the SEC
and not subject to judicial review.41 In other words, even in the event of
a successful prosecution, SEC informants may not receive any portion
of the recovery.42 The correlation between the absence of a mandatory
payout provision and a very low number of reported tips is not likely a
coincidence.
D. SOX’S OLD PROCEDURAL BACKLOG
AND WEAK PROTECTIONS
The devastating shake in investor confidence from the Enron, Tyco
and WorldCom scandals inspired the passage of the original SarbanesOxley Act (“SOX”).43 There are two specific provisions from SOX that
received the most publicity, Section 302 and Section 404. Section 302
requires senior management to certify the accuracy of reported financial
statements, and Section 404 mandates that management and auditors
maintain and assess adequate internal controls for financial reporting.44
However, SOX also contained whistleblower provisions which did not
encompass a bounty reward, but rather sought to encourage
whistleblowing based solely on an employee’s anti-retaliation cause of
action.45

Commission deems appropriate, to the person or persons who provide information
leading to the imposition of such penalty.”), with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (“If the
Government proceeds with an action brought by a person under subsection (b), such
person shall . . . receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds
of the action or settlement of the claim . . . .”).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (amended 2010) (noting that the Commission’s
determination as to an appropriate reward “shall be final and not subject to judicial
review”).
42. See id.
43. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of titles 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 of the U.S.C) [hereinafter SOX]. DoddFrank contains provisions that amend the old SOX whistleblower provisions. See
generally Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1840 (2010);
see also JAY P. LECHNER, GREENBERG TAURIG LLP, DODD-FRANK AMENDS SARBANESOXLEY AND CREATES NEW WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS 1–2 (2010), available at
http://www.gtlaw.com/portalresource/lookup/wosid/contentpilot-core-40116922
/pdfCopy.name=/GTAlert_DoddFrank%20Whistleblower%20Provisions_July2010.pdf
?view=attachment.
44. SOX §§ 302, 404.
45. Id. § 806.
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Under SOX, a covered company cannot “discharge, demote,
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate” against a
whistleblower who reports covered information to a federal regulatory
or law enforcement agency, a member or committee of Congress, or the
employee’s supervisor or such other person within the organization who
“has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct.”46 If
a whistleblower suffers retaliation for making a report, Section 806(a)
gives that employee a retaliation cause of action.47 However, before the
employee can litigate this claim in court, the employee must first file a
complaint with the Department of Labor (“DOL”), who then refers it to
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) for
investigation“”.48 Following the investigation, an administrative law
judge from the DOL hears the evidence from the investigation and
renders a decision.49 The employer may immediately stop any action
upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the employer
would have taken the action in the absence of the whistleblowing.50
SOX is telling of a potential whistleblower’s reliance on, and the
importance of, job security.51 SOX did little to encourage risk-averse
information holders to blow the whistle on corporate fraud because of
the lack of effective whistleblower protection and sufficient incentive to
report. First, SOX’s whistleblower provisions contained no financial
incentive for a potential informant. Second, the bureaucratic process of
bringing a retaliation claim often drew cases out over years, severely
setting back claimants in the meantime.52 Third, the particularly short
ninety-day statute of limitations on retaliation claims undercut the
effectiveness of these provisions, as most potential claimants did not
realize the scope of their rights and how to pursue them in such a short
period.53 Finally, SOX’s remedies only allowed for “equitable
46.
47.
48.

See id.
See id. § 806(a).
See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1757, 1761 (2007).
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality,
88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1196–97 (2010) (noting that in their study on whistleblower
incentives, protection from retaliation can be a significant incentive, particularly for
female whistleblowers).
52. See e.g., Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 552, 553 (W.D.
Va. 2006).
53. See Dworkin, supra note 48, at 1763.
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compensatory damages”54 but neither punitive nor mental anguish
damages. Overall, these statutory drafting flaws played a substantial role
in the shamefully low number of cases found in favor of SOX
claimants.55
II. THE DODD-FRANK BOUNTY PROGRAM
A. A NEW AND IMPROVED STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The Dodd-Frank bounty program incorporates many of the same
elements of prior successful bounty programs while resolving most of
the shortcomings found in other less successful bounty and
whistleblower programs. Congress modeled the Dodd-Frank Act closely
after the largely successful IRS whistleblower bounty program.56 Similar
to the mandatory payout provisions under the FCA and IRS bounty
programs,57 Section 922 provides a mandatory award for
whistleblowers. The SEC must pay whistleblowers a minimum of ten
percent and up to thirty percent of an award from a successful
prosecution of more than $1 million assessed by the SEC and recovered
in other “related actions.”58
In addition to borrowing mandatory payout provisions, Section 922
also resolves the stifling issues that once plagued the 2002 SOX
whistleblower provisions in the form of fortified job security for
54. Listed damages include reinstatement with the same seniority, back pay with
interest, and compensation for any special damages resulting from the discrimination
including litigation costs, expert witness fees and reasonable attorney fees. See 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2) (2010).
55. See Beverley Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower
Protection under Sarbanes Oxley: A Proposal for Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 20–38
(2007). Professors Earle and Madek report that through May 2006, of the 677
completed Sarbanes Oxley complaints, 499 were dismissed and ninty-five were
withdrawn. Of the cases that went to an administrative law judge, only six (two percent)
of the 286 resulted in a decision for the employee.
56. See COMM. BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, THE RESTORING AMERICAN
FINANCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 2010, S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 12 (2010).
57. See discussion supra Part I.A-B.
58. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841
(2010). “Related Actions” are judicial or administrative actions brought by the DOJ, a
self-regulatory organization (“SRO”), a state attorney general or another “appropriate
regulatory authority” that are based on original information provided by a
whistleblower that leads to the successful enforcement of an SEC action.
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whistleblowers.59 Section 922 creates a new private right of action for
employees who have suffered retaliation because of any lawful act done
by the whistleblower in providing information to the SEC.60
Whistleblowers may now bring an action in federal court61 as opposed to
an administrative court.62 This change overcomes the procedural
headaches and lengthy waiting periods that once discouraged employees
from reporting under the old SOX whistleblower provisions. 63
Furthermore, Section 922 affords employees with the right to a jury
trial64 rather than just a bench trial or a trial in front of an administrative
law judge—limits found under the old SOX provisions.65 Section 922
also further incentivizes employees to take a chance and blow the
whistle by giving sharper teeth to the remedies section of the program.
Now, courts can require corporations who retaliate against
whistleblowers to reinstate the employee and pay double-back pay with
interest, litigation costs, expert witness fees and reasonable attorney’s
fees.66
A qualifying whistleblower receives a minimum bounty of ten
percent of any monetary sanction of $1 million or higher, ensuring that a
whistleblower entitled to recovery will receive a substantial award.67
However, Section 922 places wide discretion in the hands of the SEC to
award up to three times that amount, considering, among other factors:
(1) the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower;
(2) the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower; and (3) the
programmatic interest of the Commission in deterring violations of the
relevant securities laws.68 Additionally, whistleblowers have the right to
59.
60.

See discussion supra Part I.D.
Dodd-Frank Act § 922(h)(1)(A) (“(i) in providing information to the
Commission in accordance with the whistleblower incentive section; (ii) in initiating,
testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or administrative action of the
Commission based upon or related to such information; or (iii) in making disclosures
that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . .’” the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . and “‘any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the
jurisdiction of the [SEC].’”)
61. See id. § 922(h).
62. See discussion supra Part I.D.
63. See e.g., Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 552, 553 (W.D.
Va. 2006).
64. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(j).
65. See discussion supra Part I.D.
66. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(h)(1)(C).
67. Id. § 922(b)(1)(A).
68. Id. § 922(c)(1)(B).
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be represented by counsel.69 Unlike the Insider Trading Act’s
whistleblower provisions,70 bounty determinations are subject to review
in an appropriate federal court of appeals—although the amount of an
award, as long as it falls between ten and thirty percent, is not
appealable.71
The design of the Dodd-Frank bounty program borrows the
successful aspects of its predecessors while rectifying the significant
flaws that rendered other programs ineffective. The combination of
fortified job security and potentially huge cash bounties, reminiscent of
other similar programs, will undoubtedly catch the eye of thousands of
potential bounty hunters. All in all, based upon these incentives, the
program seems destined to pump out a sizable increase in tips.72 Indeed,
the few months following Dodd-Frank’s passage indicate that the
program has already begun having its tip-generating effect.73

69.
70.
71.
72.

See id. § 922(d)(1).
See discussion supra Part I.C.
See Dodd-Frank Act § 922(f).
But see Feldman & Lobel, supra note 51, at 1194-95, 1207. In the study
conducted by these authors on whistleblowing incentives, their survey results indicated
a high reward may actually produce a “crowding out effect” that reduces
whistleblowing when the conduct being reported is particularly morally outrageous. See
id. at 1194. However, their study does show that both protection and a high reward can
serve as an incentive to blow the whistle, and point out that a “holier-than-thou effect”
is displayed in the survey results. See id. at 1207 (“The study, moreover, demonstrates
that informed policy makers must factor in the possibility that informants may
underestimate the role of financial incentives in their own decision to report. Whereas
people perceive others as reporting mainly for money, they tend to perceive their own
social enforcement actions as more ethically driven.”).
73. See Joe Palazzolo, After Dodd-Frank SEC Getting At Least One FCPA Tip A
Day, WALL ST. J. CORRUPTION CURRENTS BLOG (Sept. 30, 2010, 11:21 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2010/09/30/after-dodd-frank-sec-getting-atleast-one-fcpa-tip-a-day/ (“The Securities and Exchange Commission has been
receiving at least one tip a day about potential foreign bribery violations since a
whistleblower bounty program became law in July. . . . The figure is likely to be
sobering for international companies that have witnessed an eightfold increase in
enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act since 2004, and as multi-million
dollar settlements in such cases have become the norm. . . . Experts also predict the law
will nudge more companies to self-disclose potential FCPA violations out of fear that a
whistleblower will do it first, putting the company on bad terms with Justice and the
SEC.”).
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B. THE DODD-FRANK BOUNTY PROCESS
Bounty hunters seeking their pot of gold need not worry too much
about tricky qualifications under Dodd-Frank, as the SEC has
promulgated detailed rules setting forth the process for submitting
information.74 An in-depth discussion of the details of all of the
qualification procedures of the Dodd-Frank bounty program is beyond
the scope of this Article, particularly with respect to issues relating to
attorney/client privileged communications and attorneys acting as
whistleblowers. However, a general overview of the requirements
follows.
Generally, to qualify for a Dodd-Frank bounty, the whistleblower
must provide the SEC with “original information.”75 This means that the
information must be: (1) derived from the independent knowledge or
independent analysis of a whistleblower; (2) unknown to the
Commission from any other source; and (3) not exclusively derived
from an allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a
governmental report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media.76 “Independent knowledge” must be derived from a non-publicly
available source.77 However, a claimant may still perform an
“independent analysis” on publicly available information and still
provide “original information,” assuming the analysis “reveals
information that is not generally known to the public.”78 The definition
of “original information” contains exceptions for information derived
from attorney/client privileged communications: (1) officers, directors,
trustees, or partners of an entity who learn of the violation through
another person or through internal compliance processes; (2) employees
or other persons associated with a public accounting firm where the
information is obtained through an engagement as an independent public
accountant under the securities laws; and (3) information obtained
through a violation of criminal law.79
The SEC has promulgated specific forms and procedures for
whistleblowers to use in submitting information.80 The first is Form
TCR (for “tip, complaint, or referral”), which sets forth the original
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions, supra note 10, at 158-63.
Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a)(3).
Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b) (2012).
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(2).
Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(3).
Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4).
Id. §§ 240.21F-9 to .21F-10, 249.1800–.1801.
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information that the whistleblower is submitting.81 The form must be
signed, and the whistleblower must declare, under penalty of perjury,
that the information is true and correct to the best of the whistleblower’s
knowledge and belief.82 The form may be completed anonymously, but
if so submitted, it must be through counsel, and prior to submission the
whistleblower must sign the form under penalty of perjury and provide
it to counsel.83
If an SEC action results in a monetary sanction that may potentially
provide an award for a whistleblower, the SEC will publish a “Notice of
Covered Action” to allow whistleblowers with a prospective claim to
seek recovery of their award.84 To submit a claim, the whistleblower
must use Form WB-APP.85 While Form TCR may be submitted
anonymously, in order to claim an award on Form WB-APP, the
whistleblower must disclose their identity and verify it in a form
acceptable to the SEC prior to payment.86
Section 922 does not contain any difficult obstacles that bounty
hunters must overcome to qualify for a reward. In fact, the broad and
encompassing qualifications allow for just about anyone with original
knowledge, except a limited number of excluded parties,87 to come
forward and hit the jackpot. This apparent breadth has given rise to
concerns and criticisms that these whistleblower provisions may result
in harmful and opportunistic whistleblowing behavior that ultimately
causes more harm than good.
III. BYPASSING INTERNAL COMPLIANCE:
CRITICISMS AND RESPONSE
The whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act have been
criticized for numerous reasons.88 However, this Article focuses on one
critique that is commonly asserted—that Dodd-Frank incentivizes
bypassing costly internal compliance programs and reporting securities

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. § 240.21F-9(a)–(b).
Id.
Id. § 240.21F-9(c).
Id. § 240.21F-10(a).
Id. § 240.21F-10(b).
Id. § 240.21F-10(c).
Id. § 240.12F-8(c).
See, e.g., Ebersole, supra note 11, at 135-45.
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law violations behind the company’s back, and instead directly to the
SEC to seek an award.89
A. A RACE AGAINST TIME: EXTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWING
COMPETING AGAINST CORPORATE COMPLIANCE CONTROLS
Many have argued that the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions
may incentivize employees who uncover securities law violations to
report them directly to the SEC, thereby bypassing and undermining
internal compliance reporting mechanisms. This situation would in turn
threaten compliance efforts by dangling the prospect of a multimilliondollar bounty in front of potential whistleblowers.90 This incentive
structure could culminate in a “race” to the doorstep of the SEC before
the information is no longer “original.”91 This race includes several
fierce competitors—other potential whistleblowers who may be privy to
the same information and of course, the company suspected of the
wrongdoing. Attorneys and compliance professionals have concerns that
this race may result in several undesired consequences.
1. Forcing Companies to Self-Report
First, the race may alter the dynamics of determining when and if a
company should self-disclose potential FCPA violations to the
government.92 Rather than investigating and remediating issues in-house
before deciding whether they warrant a voluntary disclosure, companies
may feel forced to self-report when doing so would not normally be
necessary. They might feel the need to disclose even the smallest
infractions or rush to self-report issues that they do not yet understand,
in the hopes of stemming a larger, more invasive government
investigation or receiving cooperation credit.93 Rather than “driving
home the message of compliance,” the race will encourage some

89.
90.

See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMM., supra note 11.
Obiamaka P. Madubuko & Rick Firestone, New SEC Whistleblower Program
and Added Disclosure Rules in Dodd-Frank Act: Will These New Regulations Help or
Hinder FCPA Compliance Efforts? BLOOMBERG L.R. (2010), http://www.mwe.com/in
fo/pubs/firestone_madubuko_dodd-frank.pdf.
91. See id. at 4.
92. See Madubuko & Firestone, supra note 90, at 4.
93. See id.
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employees “to work secretly against their companies to first report
corruption without giving the company a chance to address the issue.”94
This race to report also runs contrary to the goal outlined in the
federal sentencing guidelines. Dating back several decades, the federal
government has encouraged corporations to implement and maintain
their own internal compliance programs and to voluntarily disclose
suspected misconduct in exchange for mitigating potentially harsher
penalties for white-collar crime.95 The current federal sentencing
guidelines provide robust incentives for corporations to implement
internal compliance programs and report suspected violations to
appropriate government regulators.96 In fact, corporate defendants can
receive credit for having an “effective compliance and ethics program,”
as well as for self-reporting suspected misconduct while fully
cooperating with regulatory authorities.97
The race incentivizes corporations to rush hastily to involve federal
authorities before other potential whistleblowers beat them to the punch.
Pressing on corporations is the potential loss of credits that may result
from a whistleblower getting to the doorstep first. Accordingly, the race
undermines the goal of the federal sentencing guidelines by encouraging
self-reporting prior to a thorough internal investigation. Internal
compliance programs thrive best when they are actually used and not
overlooked.

94.
95.

Id.
See MICHAEL DIAZ JR. ET AL., DIAZ RUES, ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS,
Whistle-Blowers, Dodd-Frank and the FCPA: The Perfect ‘Anti-Competitive’ Storm for
U.S. Businesses, 6 (Jan. 25, 2011), http://documents.jdsupra.com/7062c02d-ac97-49a4a7b7-b8ed185e82d2.pdf; see also Michael Goldsmith & Chad W. King, Policing
Corporate Crime: The Dilemma of Internal Compliance Programs, 50 VAND. L. REV.
1, 3–4 (1997) (“In recent years, federal and state laws have sought to promote good
corporate citizenship by encouraging business entities to establish internal compliance
programs designed to avoid—or at least detect—illicit conduct. The most significant
impetus toward effective internal corporate policing occurred in 1991, when the United
States Sentencing Guidelines . . . made the existence of an ‘effective’ internal
compliance program the sine qua non for receiving leniency upon conviction. As a
result, corporations nationwide have sought to establish compliance programs that
qualify for preferred treatment under federal law.”).
96. See DIAZ ET AL., supra note 95, at 6; see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 18
U.S.C. App’x § 8C2.5(f) (2010).
97. See DIAZ ET AL., supra note 95, at 6.
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2. Discouraging Cooperation with Regulatory Authorities
Second, some argue that this race to report may disincentivize
whistleblowers from helping their companies cooperate with the
regulatory authorities. Under Dodd-Frank, the bounty is structured as a
percentage of a corporation’s total monetary sanction.98 Accordingly,
facilitating the company’s cooperation with government investigators
can actually lead to a decrease in the sanctions imposed, thereby
diminishing the whistleblower’s award in the process.99 A
whistleblower, therefore, would benefit from a corporation who does not
receive credits for cooperation with regulatory agencies.
3. Increased Costs from Flimsy and Frivolous Tips
Third, the race to report may encourage employees to rush to the
SEC with unreliable and frivolous claims. Frivolous claims drain
government and corporate investigative resources and the desire to
receive an award could also give rise to a “lottery mentality” that
transforms a company’s own employees into bounty hunters.“”’ Given
the potential to collect record-setting rewards from a settlement or
action, bounty hunters may play the odds by eagerly seeking out any
opportunity to report potential misconduct in hopes of striking gold.
This “just in case” mindset may lead employees who may not
understand the elements of a particular securities law violation to report
information to the SEC on a matter that is not actually a violation of the
law. For example, many argue that the FCPA, which falls within the
SEC’s enforcement authority, lacks sufficient clarity and contains many
ambiguities.100 Additionally, there is little case law interpreting the
FCPA given that most cases end in settlement.101 Thus, incentivizing
98.
99.
100.

Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a)(4), (b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010).
See DIAZ ET AL., supra note 95, at 7.
Mike Koehler, The Financial Reform Bill’s Whistleblower Provisions and the
FCPA, FCPAPROFESSOR.BLOGSPOT.COM (July 20, 2010, 12:02 AM), http://fcpaprofes
sor.blogspot.com/2010/07/financial-reform-bills-whistleblower.html.
101. See id. (“Against the backdrop of little substantive FCPA case law, the FCPA
is enforced based largely on government enforcement agency interpretations that have
never been accepted by a court. For every FCPA enforcement action alleging conduct
that all reasonable minds would agree violates the FCPA, there is seemingly three
FCPA enforcement actions alleging conduct that many reasonable minds question
whether the conduct even violates the FCPA. Yet, these latter FCPA enforcement
actions, notwithstanding the dubious and untested legal theories they are based on, are
routinely settled by companies via a resolution vehicle that does not require the
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employees to blow the whistle in a complex area of law could result in a
rash of flimsy and frivolous tips.
Further, the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection may only
solidify the probability that meritless tips will reach new heights.102
Whistleblower protection applies to whistleblowers regardless of
whether they provide a tip that does not end in an enforcement action.103
Therefore, a disgruntled employee who fears discipline or termination
may report false or exaggerated tips to obtain whistleblower insulation
in an effort to shield him or her from termination.104 Companies will
likely feel discouraged about pursuing questionable claims due to what
is at stake with a jury trial in federal court—especially considering the
formidable remedies105 available to employees.
Based upon these fears, some believe a new era has begun:
[Where] internal corporate investigations of FCPA violations will
never be the same, with a bevy of eager, lurking whistle-blowers
attempting to sponge information from the investigation and then
recasting, packaging and selling it as “original information” to
hungry government prosecutors and investigators in order to cash in
106
their chips at the Justice Department’s dealer table.

B. ANSWERING THE CRITICISMS: THE THREAT OF EXTERNAL
WHISTLEBLOWING IS A NECESSARY COMPANION TO EFFECTIVE
INTERNAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

The whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank are not perfect, and
will almost certainly give rise to some problematic and opportunistic
behavior from potential whistleblowers. No incentive system is free
company to admit or deny the SEC’s allegations. Quite simply, a settled SEC FCPA
enforcement action does not necessarily represent the triumph of the SEC’s legal
position over the company’s, but rather reflects a risk-based decision primarily
grounded in issues other than facts and the law. It is simply easier and more costefficient for a company to settle an SEC FCPA enforcement (notwithstanding whatever
dubious and untested legal theory it is based on) than to participate in long, protracted
litigation with its principal government regulator.”).
102. See DIAZ ET AL., supra note 95, at 4.
103. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922(h), 124 Stat. 1376, 1845 (2010); 17 C.F.R. §
240.21F-2(b) (2011).
104. See DIAZ ET AL., supra note 95, at 8.
105. See discussion supra Part II.
106. DIAZ ET AL., supra note 95, at 8.
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from the potential for exploitation. However, a review of the academic
literature on internal compliance programs and whistleblowing provides
evidence that the concerns of bypassing effective internal compliance
programs and the dire consequences prophesied are likely overblown.
Additionally, it is still not at all clear whether internal compliance
programs are effective in detecting or deterring fraud, particularly largescale financial fraud involving upper-level management. Thus, the threat
of external whistleblowing is a potentially effective method to monitor
internal compliance programs that are not enforced. By providing
financial incentives for external whistleblowing in certain cases, the
Dodd-Frank bounty program provides a much-needed check for the type
of corporate fraud that is least likely to be reported internally, and
provides balance to the focus on self-regulation.
1. Externally Mandated or Incentivized Compliance Programs:
Effective Self-Regulation or Ineffective Window Dressing?
The rise of internal compliance programs in the United States as a
widely accepted means of corporate regulation began at least as early as
the mid-1980s,107 and perhaps as early as the 1960s.108 Internal
compliance programs received formal approval with the adoption of the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991 (“OSGs”),109 which
though modified, are still in use today.110 Through the potential for
sentencing leniency, these guidelines provide incentives to corporations
with effective internal compliance and ethics programs.111 The
centerpiece of these internal compliance programs is typically the
development, and hopefully implementation, of a formal code of ethics.
Given that internal compliance programs have experienced broad
acceptance and adoption in the corporate community for quite some

107. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 497 (2003) (noting that fifty-five defense
contractors agreed to adopt ethics codes and internal ethics officers in a bid to fend off
federal regulators in a defense contracting scandal).
108. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559,
1579-82 (1990) (stating the initial catalyst for corporate internal compliance structures
as the price fixing scandals in the 1960’s involving companies, including General
Electric, in the heavy electrical equipment industry).
109. Krawiec, supra note 107, at 497.
110. See supra note 91 & discussion Part III.A.
111. See id.
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time, it would be reasonable to assume that there is significant evidence
of their efficacy in deterring illegal or unethical behavior. Unfortunately,
this is not the case.112 Although these programs have been widely
adopted for years, there is very little empirical evidence to substantiate
the assumption that they are effective in deterring fraud or illegal
conduct.113
In 2003, Professor Krawiec noted the existence of studies
supporting the effectiveness of internal compliance programs, but also
pointed out their methodological problems. Professor Krawiec
demonstrated that they relied upon either self-reporting in surveys or
hypothetical questions in lab settings, as opposed to studying actual
employee conduct in real-world settings.114 Additionally, she noted that
the findings in these studies were contradicted by a large number of
other studies, which found no significant relationship between internal
ethics codes implemented in these programs and employee conduct.115
Little has changed in the intervening years, and in conducting research
for this Article, the authors found that studies conducted to date still do
not clearly indicate that internal compliance programs are an effective
deterrent to fraudulent or illegal conduct.116
112. See Krawiec, supra note 107, at 512–13 (“There has been very little research,
however, that seeks to determine whether these structures deter illegal conduct. Instead,
most research on internal compliance structures has focused on the percentage of
companies using various structures, analysis of the substantive content of ethics and
conduct codes, employee surveys of their perceptions of their company’s conduct
codes, and self-reporting of conduct code violations.”).
113. Id. at 510–15.
114. Id. at 511–15.
115. Id. However, she does note that many of these studies also suffer from some of
the same methodological problems as those finding that compliance programs are
effective.
116. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Decentralized Enforcement in
Organizations: An Experimental Approach, 2 REG. GOVERNANCE 165, 168 (2008)
(“There is a dearth of empirical studies that integrate both the institutional and
behavioral aspects of social enforcement. While there have been significant recent
developments in the legal protections offered to whistle-blowers, the mechanisms and
incentive structures under which individual enforcement operates have remained largely
indecipherable.”); see also David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on SarbanesOxley and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1790
(2007) (“A recent review of studies on codes of ethics shows that approximately half of
the studies found that codes were effective in reducing unethical behavior, and half did
not find a significant relationship. Thus, these studies do not establish clear support for
whether or not codes of ethics directly reduce unethical behavior.”).
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In a 2007 study, Professors Kaptein & Schwartz reviewed 79
empirical studies on the effectiveness of codes of ethics, and found
mixed results: 35% found that they were effective; 16% found only a
weak relationship in deterring unethical behavior; 33% found that there
was no significant relationship; and 14% found mixed results.117 More
recently, Professor Kaptein conducted a study on whether the existence
of a code of ethics reduced unethical conduct, and on the effectiveness
of various aspects of codes of ethics.118 The five dimensions studied
were: (1) the existence of a code of ethics; (2) the frequency of
communication activities regarding the code of ethics; (3) the quality of
said communications; (4) the content of the code of ethics; and (5) the
embedment of the code into the organization by management.119 By
evaluating effectiveness across these multiple dimensions, he was able
to study both the relative importance of each factor and how the factors
interacted with each other.120
Professor Kaptein found that the mere presence of a code of ethics
had very little explanatory value on the absence of unethical behavior.121
When none of the other independent variables were present, the mere
presence of a code of ethics had a slight negative relationship to
unethical behavior.122 However, when the other variables were
considered, the relationship became insignificant, and in some scenarios,
even had a positive relationship to occurrences of unethical behavior.123
The variable that had the biggest positive impact in deterring unethical
behavior was the positive example set by senior and local management
who embedded the content of the code into the organization by
modeling ethical behavior in their own actions.124 The presence of the
code itself had little to no effect, while the modeling of ethical behavior
by management did. This leads to the conclusion that the more
important and effective deterrent to fraud is managers who are ethical

117. Muel Kaptein & Mark Schwartz, The Effectiveness of Business Codes: A
Critical Examination of Existing Studies and the Development of an Integrated
Research Model, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 111, 113 (2007).
118. Muel Kaptein, Toward Effective Codes: Testing the Relationship with
Unethical Behavior, 99 J. BUS. ETHICS 233, 234 (2011).
119. Id. at 234–37.
120. See id. at 238–39.
121. Id. at 244.
122. Id. at 245.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 247.
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and enforce ethical standards, and not the mere presence of formal codes
and compliance programs.
Additionally, the federal policy of encouraging self-regulation
through internal compliance programs may actually create a perverse
incentive for what is often referred to as “cosmetic compliance.” This
phenomenon involves a situation where an entity sets up formal internal
compliance controls that are largely ineffective or unenforced, and
instead act as mere window dressing for the purposes of obtaining
leniency in case of regulatory enforcement.125 Weaver, Trevino, &
Cochran have found that ethics and compliance programs motivated by
external factors only (such as negative media coverage or governmental
pressure through mechanisms such as the OSGs) often lead to formal
ethics programs that are easily decoupled from the everyday business
operations of the company and bear the indicia of cosmetic
compliance.126 These decoupled compliance programs have formal
reporting mechanisms and policies, but are not integrated into the
everyday business affairs of the organization. They have little impact on
regular business decisions and actions.127 Because they are decoupled
from the daily operations of the business, these externally driven
compliance programs are not a priority or concern for upper-level
management and are thus largely ineffective in establishing ethical and
compliant behavior in a company.128
The current government incentivized internal compliance regime
only effectively addresses the formal processes and mechanisms of
compliance programs, but does little to address the internal ethical
norms and culture of the firm.129 Since 2004, the OSGs have required
that effective compliance programs “promote an organizational culture
that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with

125.
126.

Krawiec, supra note 107, at 492.
See Gary R. Weaver et al., Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social
Performance: Management Commitments, External Pressures, and Corporate Ethics
Practices, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 539, 541, 547 (1999) (“An easily decoupled structure or
policy provides the appearance of conformity to external expectations while making it
easy to insulate much of the organization from those expectations. Although the
structure or policy exists, there is no guarantee that it will regularly interact with other
organizational policies and functions or that employees will be accountable to it.”).
127. Id. at 540.
128. Id.
129. See Hess, supra note 116, at 1806.
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the law” and provide minimum standards for doing so.130 However,
these minimum standards relate to formal oversight, communication and
response requirements rather than addressing the more informal
mechanisms through which culture is built in an organization.131
Compounding this problem is the fact that it is difficult for a court or
regulatory body to determine whether an internal compliance program
has been legitimately implemented and enforced, or if the program was
in place merely to give the appearance of legitimacy.132
Effective procedures and processes are certainly important for
internal compliance programs, and their implementation should be
encouraged or required by government policy. However, legal
requirements and government policy are inherently limited in their
ability to directly affect ethical culture in an organization.133 Formal
requirements and processes for internal compliance and ethics programs
are not in and of themselves sufficient, or even effective, in deterring
illegal behavior when a company retains a corporate culture that allows
or encourages corrupt behavior.134 Accordingly, in order for
whistleblowing to be effective, a balance must be struck between
corporate self-reporting/internal compliance and the ability for
whistleblowers to report directly to the government.135
130.
131.

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. App’x § 8B2.1(a)(2), (b) (2006).
Id. § 8B2.1(b); see Peter Verhezen, Giving Voice in a Culture of Silence: From
a Culture of Compliance to a Culture of Integrity, 96 J. BUS. ETHICS 187, 187–88
(2010).
132. See Krawiec, supra note 107, at 492; see also Donald C. Langevoort,
Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 113–14 (noting that because of the complex incentive
structures and behavioral factors that influence implementation of compliance
programs, it is difficult to find objective indicators for the administrative and judicial
system to evaluate their effectiveness).
133. Hess, supra note 116, at 1806.
134. See David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform
Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 317-18
(2008) (noting the example of Baker Hughes, Inc., which in 2001 was required as part
of a cease and desist order to develop internal accounting controls to prevent improper
bribe payments, but in 2007 was accused again of paying bribes, and in a deferred
prosecution agreement admitted to paying bribes in Kazakhstan as late as November of
2003); see also Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing Ethics & Legal Compliance:
What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 131 (1999) (“In this study, we
found that specific characteristics of the formal ethics or compliance program matter
less than broader perceptions of the program’s orientation toward values and ethical
aspirations.”).
135. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 51, at 1157.
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2. Understanding the Motivations for Whistleblowing
To evaluate the potential effects of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower
provisions on internal reporting, one must also understand why
employees report (or fail to report) wrongdoing, and specifically when
an employee is most likely to circumvent internal compliance processes
and blow the whistle externally. When an employee encounters
wrongdoing in the workplace, following the formal internal compliance
process or blowing the whistle externally are not the only options
available. Employees may sit idly by and do nothing, confront the
violator directly or report to a manager or supervisor.136 Understanding
why employees blow the whistle as opposed to taking other available
actions is difficult because it involves the interaction of internal
motivations (such as individual employees’ sense of morality, altruism
or self-interest), as well as organizational and environmental
considerations (such as ethical culture, internal governance policies,
organizational environment and regulatory environment).137 Numerous
factors can play a part in the decision, such as the magnitude of the
harm, the organizational status of the violator and the level of moral
outrage at the conduct.138
The motivations and behaviors of whistleblowers have been
relatively under-researched.139 Professors Miceli & Near attribute this
lack of empirical research partially to significant challenges both
conceptually and methodologically in researching this area.140 For
example, in order to obtain data on actual whistleblowing events,
researchers must find individuals with knowledge of unlawful or
unethical conduct in their company and persuade them to agree to
identify themselves to the researcher.141 Researchers find it difficult to
136. See Muel Kaptein, From Inaction to External Whistleblowing: The Influence of
the Ethical Culture of Organizations on Employee Responses to Observed Wrongdoing,
98 J. BUS. ETHICS 513, 514–15 (2011) (discussing generally the various response that
employees may have to observed wrongdoing).
137. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 116, at 166–69.
138. Id. at 175.
139. Id. at 168; see also Marcia P. Miceli & Janet P. Near, Standing Up or Standing
By: What Predicts Blowing the Whistle on Organizational Wrongdoing, 24 RES.
PERSONNEL & HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. 95, 124 (2005) (“Very little controlled research
on whistleblowing has been published, particularly in top journals; with more research,
we might have more new directions to report.”).
140. See Miceli & Near, supra note 139, at 125-29.
141. Id. at 126.
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locate these individuals and obtain this data because of the potential
negative consequences of blowing the whistle. Additionally, the earlier
studies conducted on the motivations of whistleblowing are of fairly
limited value, as they focus on individual motivational considerations
rather than the interaction of internal individual factors with external
organizational and environmental factors.142 However, there are two
recent studies on whistleblowing behavior which provide some insight
into how organizational and governmental factors affect whistleblowing.
In a 2008 study, Professors Feldman and Lobel simultaneously
examined numerous factors commonly present in organizations to
determine their impact on reporting misconduct both internally and
externally.143 The study was conducted using a survey wherein
participants answered questions regarding five different scenarios of
misconduct—theft, financial fraud, environmental misconduct, safety
violations and harassment.144 The participants answered questions as if
they were the employee discovering each scenario.145 The questions
measured various factors surrounding the observed misconduct, such as
degree of moral outrage, perceived social norms regarding the
misconduct and the method of reporting selected.146
The study turned out some noteworthy findings regarding
whistleblowing. First, internal reporting tends to be used for “less
important” matters involving lower level employees, such as employee
theft, rather than more extensive problems, such as environmental
problems or financial fraud.147 Second, the situation in which the
subjects were least likely to engage in any type of reporting, whether
internally or externally, was financial fraud committed by
management.148 The study concluded that this was because any type of
reporting in this scenario necessarily requires implicating management,
and thus employees must be willing to pay a high price to report any
such conduct.149 Third, the study found that external reporting was
associated with an escalation of the intensity of illegality of the conduct,
and the more widespread the illegality was throughout the organization
142. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 116, at 169; see also Marcia P. Miceli et al., Who
Blows the Whistle and Why?, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 113, 114 (1991).
143. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 116, at 169–70.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 171.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 175.
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(particularly with management), the less likely it was to be reported
internally.150 For example, where employees know or suspect that the
payment of bribes is commonplace and/or endorsed by upper-level
management, they will be less likely to report any illicit payments
through internal compliance channels because of the belief that any such
reporting would be futile.
Additionally, this study found that when an organization
emphasizes internal compliance, it can have a positive effect on the
willingness of employees to internally report illegal behavior and a
negative effect on external reporting.151 While this can serve as an
effective means of policing misconduct when the internal compliance
program is legitimate, where management is complicit in or otherwise
benefits from the misconduct, this can lead to management illicitly
emphasizing internal reporting solely to prevent external discovery of
the misconduct.152 Professor Langevoort proffers two examples where
this may be the case.153 First, if society does not sufficiently enforce the
law by imposing an adequate penalty, it can be more economically
efficient for a company to allow a certain level of profitable violation.154
Second, if managers are not held personally liable and their payment
structure is not properly aligned with the interests of the company, they
can personally benefit from profitability associated with illegal conduct
with little or no commensurate penalty.155
In a more recent study, Feldman and Lobel expanded their research
to include the consideration of various regulatory incentives, including
monetary bounties, on whistleblowing.156 This study measured the
effectiveness of four types of regulatory incentives for whistleblowing:
(1) protection from retaliation; (2) a legal duty to report; (3) fines for
failure to report; and (4) monetary incentives for reporting.157 All
participants in the study’s survey received the same fact pattern of
misconduct, and each was asked to predict their own reaction as well as

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 181.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 180.
See Langevoort, supra note 132, at 80.
Id.
Id.
See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 51, at 1176.
Id.
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the reaction of others in light of various combinations of the four
regulatory incentives listed above.158
As one would expect, the perceived severity of the misconduct had
a significant effect on the likelihood to report.159 When the severity of
the misconduct is perceived as low, external incentives matter much
more in the motivation to report, because the internal motivation of
moral outrage is missing.160 For these respondents, offering a large
monetary reward or imposing a legal duty to report and granting a large
monetary reward provided a very strong incentive for blowing the
whistle.161
However, whenever the internal moral motivation to report was
high, offering a large monetary award was not as strong of an incentive
for reporting.162 For these respondents, other external incentives, such as
a legal duty to report and protection from retaliation, were reported as a
stronger incentive than a high reward.163 This suggests that there may be
a limited “crowding out” effect, whereby offering a large monetary
incentive for whistleblowing is counter-productive because it
undermines the internal ethical and moral motivations for reporting
wrongdoing.164 This conclusion recognizes that while people do respond
to monetary incentives as classic economics predicts, these are not the
only motivators of human behavior.165
The study results also showed that the respondents tended to
undermine the role of money in their own decision to report, while
believing it would be very influential in others decisions to report.166
The respondents perceived that the imposition of a legal duty to report
would be a dominant factor in their own reporting decision.167 However,
the results showed that in the scenario where a legal duty imposed plus a
large monetary reward was offered versus the scenario where only a

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 1188.
See id. at 1193–95.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1180.
See id. at 1193-95; see also Lawrence M. Friedman, Coming of Age: Law and
Society Enters an Exclusive Club, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 1, 14 (2005) (“There is
no question that human beings do react to the carrot and the stick. However, people are
not blindly mechanical cost-benefit machines . . . .”).
166. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 51 at 1199.
167. Id.
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large monetary reward was offered, the legal duty provided only a
marginal increase in reporting.168 This indicates that there is a tendency
to underestimate the perceived effect that a monetary reward has on the
decision to blow the whistle.169
Overall, the study found that a monetary reward is an important
incentive for reporting, particularly when the conduct is not perceived as
being overtly morally offensive.170 The size of the bounty is critical, as
small monetary awards were not a strong incentive and actually
decreased the rate of reporting when there was no moral outrage at the
conduct reported.171 Generally, where the perceived moral outrage of the
wrongdoing was high, the external incentives for reporting were less
important. Nonetheless, external monetary incentives still provided an
increase in reporting in such situations.172
These studies have their limitations; b oth studies rely upon survey
data of self-reported reactions to hypothetical factual situations, as
opposed to analyzing actual examples of whistleblowers reporting
misconduct.173 Additionally, in order to determine the level of moral
outrage, the second study relied upon the subjective perception of one
fact pattern, rather than using multiple fact patterns to obtain a broader
sample of which violations people found morally offensive.174 The
second study also relied on hypothetical survey results of when a

168.
169.

Id.
See id. at 1200, 1203 (“In fact, high rewards were highly influential at the
experimental stage, but those high rewards were ranked as the least influential factors
when respondents were consciously estimating what factors influenced their own
decisions to report.”).
170. See id. at 1202 (“When the ethical significance attached to the reporting act is
absent, the level of monetary compensation offered through the regulatory system is
decisive.”).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 1188; see also Feldman & Lobel, supra note 116, at 180–81; see also
Miceli & Near, supra note 139, at 126–27 (“As we have described in depth
previously . . . , laboratory and scenario studies, while quite useful for many other
topics, are not the solution for whistle-blowing. Like the longitudinal or multi-source
design, they address certain problems, but create others that are equally if not more
likely to be ‘fatal’ to internal validity, and raise questions of external validity as well.
For example, it is well-understood that social desirability or a wish to please the
experimenter leads many people to say they would do the ‘right thing’ when it is
described on paper, when in reality they would not.”).
174. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 51, at 1188.
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respondent would be motivated by a bounty as opposed to individuals
actually faced with the opportunity to receive a bounty for reporting.
Therefore, there is a distinct possibility that the respondents
underestimated the role that a financial incentive could play in people’s
decisions, as Professors Feldman and Lobel admit.175 Nevertheless, these
studies are the most thorough and recent empirical studies on
whistleblowing incentives. When considered together, they provide
important insights into the potential effect that the bounty provisions of
the Dodd-Frank Act may have on whistleblowing and internal
compliance programs.
While internal reporting procedures may be effective in some
situations, they are not an effective reporting mechanism for all types of
misconduct. Respondents favored internal reporting in smaller, “less
important” instances of misconduct, but internal reporting is the least
likely when management is involved in the misconduct at issue.176
Additionally, the type of misconduct least likely to be reported at all,
whether internally or externally, was financial fraud by management.177
This suggests that for the very type of fraud that the Dodd-Frank Act is
most concerned with policing,178 management could be incentivized to
focus on internal reporting not to stop the conduct, but to discourage
government discovery and intervention.179 Further, this suggests that in
order to encourage employees to be willing to take the risk of
implicating management in wrongdoing, additional government
incentives such as a bounty may be effective in increasing external
reporting of managerial level financial fraud, which is otherwise
unlikely to be reported.180
Despite the potential for underreporting on the effect of financial
incentives inherent in Feldman and Lobel’s second study,181 it still
showed that monetary incentives can increase external self-reporting.182
This is especially the case when the misconduct is not of a particularly
egregious nature,183 and has important implications for the external
reporting of financial fraud. Certain types of financial fraud, such as
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 1207.
Feldman & Lobel, supra note 116, at 171.
Id.
See discussion supra Introduction.
See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 116, at 180–81.
Id.
See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 51, at 1188.
See id. at 1202.
Id.
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violations of accounting standards, are highly technical, and thus not
inherently morally outrageous, or they exist in a legal grey area where
the conduct can be argued as legal or moral.
Additionally, when an organization has created a culture where
corrupt behavior is acceptable, individual employees can become
desensitized to the conduct such that it becomes commonplace and no
longer shocking, despite remaining appalling to those outside the
situation.184 Much of the financial fraud that occurred in the recent
financial crisis would fit this description.185 In these situations, fraud
could be of a significant size and scope and damaging to the economy,
but unlikely to be reported or dealt with internally.186 The bounty
provisions of Dodd-Frank provide an economic incentive for external
reporting of this type of fraud, which has otherwise been difficult to
uncover until substantial societal harm has already occurred.
2. The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions as a Check
on Ineffective Internal Compliance Programs
In light of the above analysis, the bounties provided under DoddFrank appear reasonably tailored to supplement internal reporting, not
bypass it. Some have proposed that in order to avoid the potential for
undermining internal compliance and ethics programs, the SEC should
require whistleblower provisions under Dodd-Frank to first report any
misconduct through internal compliance channels before reporting to the
SEC.187 While such a requirement would help preserve internal
184. See Hess, supra note 116, at 1797; see also Hess & Ford, supra note 134, at
319–325 (explaining how paying bribes can become institutionalized into a culture and
employees begin to rationalize the behavior such that they become routine and no
longer cause any moral outrage).
185. See, e.g., Wyatt, supra note 9 (discussing the SEC’s intent to pursue additional
financial fraud cases stemming from the mortgage backed securities created during the
financial crisis). Given the complex nature of the mortgage backed securities created
during the financial crisis and their widespread use and acceptance, it is highly doubtful
that most of the lower level employees involved in their structuring and offering
understood them completely or understood any fraud that may have been involved in
their offering.
186. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 116, at 171.
187. See e.g., Ebersole, supra note 11, at 151; see also Bruce Carton, Pitfalls
Emerge in Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounty Provision, SECURITIESDOCKET.COM
(Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/09/09/pitfalls-emerge-in-doddfrank-whistleblower-bounty-provision/.
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reporting, it would also subject employees who are not confident in their
company’s internal compliance to report through a channel that they
know or suspect may not be effective or taken seriously.188 The
whistleblowing process is an emotionally draining one.189 Reporting
through ineffective internal channels may subject a whistleblower to
social ostracization or other psychological mistreatment by fellow
employees and management, which can be extremely demoralizing. The
final SEC rules strike the appropriate balance between internal and
external reporting by incentivizing, but not requiring, reporting through
internal compliance channels.190
Under the final SEC rules, whistleblowers will still be considered
for an award even if they first report through internal compliance with
their employer, and their employer subsequently reports to the SEC.191
In order to trigger this provision, the whistleblower must also submit the
information to the SEC on the required forms within 120 days of the
internal report.192 This provides the company with sufficient time to
evaluate the claims made by the whistleblower and determine whether to
inform the whistleblower that no violation has taken place, or self-report
the violation to the SEC.
As an additional incentive for whistleblowers to internally report,
the final rules expressly set forth various factors that the SEC may
consider in determining the amount of award to a whistleblower.193
Participation in internal compliance systems, which includes internal
reporting as well as assisting in internal investigations, may increase a
whistleblower’s overall award.194 Conversely, the SEC may consider
any interference with internal compliance channels, including providing
any materially false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or reports to
internal compliance, as a factor that may decrease the award given to a
whistleblower.195
The required size of the monetary sanction to trigger a bounty also
serves as a level of protection against bypassing internal compliance.
The studies discussed above indicate that a small reward is not a
significant motivator for blowing the whistle, and that for minor matters,
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See supra Part III.B.1.
Feldman & Lobel, supra note 51, at 1158–59.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-4, .21F-6 (2011).
See id. § 240.21F-4(c)(3).
See id.
See id. § 240.21F-6.
See id. § 240.21F-6(a)(4).
See id. § 240.21F-6(b)(3).
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employees prefer to report internally.196 The bounty provisions of DoddFrank are not triggered unless there is a monetary sanction of at least $1
million.197 Thus, employees will not be motivated to bypass internal
compliance reporting unless they believe the misconduct is large and
widespread enough to trigger such a sanction, the very type of fraud that
is the least likely to be reported internally.198 This floor on the monetary
sanction not only ensures that the whistleblower will receive a
substantial reward if a successful action is brought (which is required to
provide sufficient incentive), but also helps ensure that employees will
not bypass internal compliance on small matters. The floor allows
internal compliance programs to maintain an ongoing role of policing
misconduct and encouraging internal reporting, which cuts off problems
before they become substantial.
These final SEC rules, in conjunction with the statutory structure,
adequately address critiques that the bounty provisions will force
companies to self-report in order to win the race to report,199 will
disincentivize cooperation with regulatory authorities200 and incentivize
frivolous tips to the SEC.201 To the extent that an organization has an
effective internal compliance program that is embraced and believed in
by employees, the whistleblowing mechanism in the rules provides an
incentive for employees to first report internally. It also gives adequate
time to the organization to determine whether the decision to self-report
should be made. The opportunity to increase the whistleblower’s share
of the sanction as their reward202 helps offset the incentive to bypass
internal reporting in an attempt to increase the size of the sanction.
Under any whistleblower structure, there will be frivolous tips.
However, if the organization has a robust compliance process in place,
in conjunction with a cultural norm of internally reporting and dealing
with misconduct, organizations have ample opportunity to address the
merits of a complaint with the employee before it is reported.
Far from undercutting internal compliance programs, these
whistleblower provisions provide a check on ineffective internal
compliance programs. While a court or regulator may not be in the best
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See discussion supra Part III.B.II.
Dodd-Frank Act § 922(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1842 (2010).
See discussion supra Part III.B.II.
See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4) (2011).
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position to adequately assess whether an internal compliance program is
truly effective,203 employees within an organization are uniquely
positioned to gauge the ethical climate of the organization and determine
whether reporting internally will be futile or result in affirmative action
to remedy the problem. The decision to blow the whistle is a complex
one, and aligning incentives to maximize proper reporting while also
minimizing frivolous reporting is difficult.204 While experience will tell
us where these whistleblower provisions fall short (as they undoubtedly
will in some regard), the final rules drafted by the SEC represent wellcrafted regulations that strike a balance between internal and external
reporting. By allowing, but not directly incentivizing, employees to
report directly to the SEC rather than through internal compliance
structures, these rules provide a measure of much needed accountability
to corporate internal compliance programs without undercutting them.
C. DEALING WITH DODD-FRANK:
CREATING AND INCENTIVIZING AN ETHICAL CULTURE TO DRIVE
INTERNAL COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING.
The best method for dealing with Dodd-Frank is for organizations
to move past focusing only on the formal aspects of the structure of their
compliance programs, and to integrate their ethics and compliance
programs into the fabric of their organizational culture.205 As with so
many things in life, this is easier said than done. Attorneys and
compliance professionals tend to focus on “check-the-box” requirements
in drafting and designing internal compliance programs, focusing more
on strict legal requirements rather than on the organizational
implications and efficacy of the program.206 But changing the

203.
204.

See Krawiec, supra note 107, at 491.
Feldman & Lobel, supra note 51, at 1157–59 (“Because of its inherent risks,
whistle-blowing must be incentivized through regulatory policies that will encourage
individuals to break the code of silence in corrupt organizations. However, identifying
and understanding the various predictors of social enforcement in organizations is
highly complex, as predictors are comprised of individual, organizational, and statelevel factors.”).
205. See Weaver et al., supra note 126, at 541; see also Tom Tyler et al., The
Ethical Commitment to Compliance: Building Value-Based Cultures, 50 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 31, 32 (2008).
206. See, e.g., Hess, supra note 116, at 1791–92 (noting the difference between
“compliance based” programs, which focus on deterrence through formal compliance
programs designed to detect and punish violations, and “integrity based” programs,
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organizational culture is much more difficult than simply drafting a new
policy or implementing a new process. By understanding what drives
ethical behavior of employees in organizations, attorneys and other
compliance professionals can implement compliance processes and
interact with organizational constituents in a way that will maximize the
opportunity to develop a culture of ethical decision-making and internal
reporting.
1. Focus on Management Commitment,
Communication and Congruency
Research shows that organizational culture starts from the “tone at
the top.”207 When the CEO and other high-level managers do not express
a commitment to ethics and are uninvolved in compliance programs, the
compliance programs are less likely to have an effect on employee
behavior.208
However, it is not enough for management to simply express a
commitment to compliance—the commitment must be visible and there
must be effective communication of this commitment between the
employees and management.209 High-level managers tend to selfidentify closely with their organization, and thus often have a more
sanguine view of the ethical climate than do lower-level employees
working inV the trenches.210 Additionally, top managers often do not
communicate frequently with lower-level managers, and vice-versa.211
This two-way lack of communication can create problems. For example,
a CEO may have a commitment to ethical behavior and compliance, but
this commitment is not communicated to the employees adequately, and
is not visible to them. Conversely, lower level employees may know of

which focus on establishing organizational values and integrating ethics into decisionmaking).
207. Linda Klebe Trevino, Out of Touch, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1195, 1198 (2005)
(“Research has found that the CEO’s ‘commitment to ethics’ influences the scope,
orientation, and integration of formal ethics/compliance programs.”); see also Weaver
et al., supra note 126, at 547 (“Our findings support theoretical claims that senior
management’s personal commitment to ethics is an essential part of what drives
organizations to proactive, social responsible performance.”).
208. Trevino, supra note 207, at 1198–1200.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 1208.
211. Id.
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unethical or unlawful practices that the company is engaged in while
upper-level management naively believes everything is fine.212
In addition to the importance of communication, a recent study
found that when there is a high level of congruency in senior
management, employees are more likely to call an internal
whistleblowing hotline, and less likely to blow the whistle externally. 213
Thus, it is important that employees not only have a commitment to
ethics communicated to them by management, but that top management
communicate and display their behavior in accordance with the ethical
norms of the company.
Of course, attorneys and other compliance professionals are limited
in their ability to control management or influence it to behave in an
ethical manner or communicate their values. Nevertheless, compliance
programs can be structured such that communication channels regarding
organizational ethics allow for the flow of information as easily as
possible from the top down, and from the bottom up, on a regular basis.
Most internal compliance programs focus on formal communication
channels, such as hotlines or internal reporting procedures, while
informal communications channels are often viewed as ineffective.214
Formal communication channels are important, however, informal
communications can also be critical in encouraging employees to report
wrongdoing.215 Compliance managers should encourage management to
utilize informal methods of communication to engage in discussion and
dialogue on ethics throughout the organization.
Managers can increase their influence and learn by engaging
employees at all levels in informal dialogue on ethics and compliance
issues and taking advantage of the speed of informal information
flow.216 Informal, low-pressure communications can also be much less
212.
213.

See id. at 1209.
See Muel Kapstein, From Inaction to External Whistleblowing: The Influence
of the Ethical Culture of Organizations on Employee Responses to Observed
Wrongdoing, 98 J. BUS. ETHICS 513, 517–23 (2011) (defining congruency as “the extent
to which managers apply organizational standards to their own behavior”).
214. See id. at 527.
215. See id. (noting that the majority of the respondents in the study favored some
type of informal reporting of wrongdoing—81% favored reporting to a manager and
52% favored direct resolution, while only 44% favored calling a formal ethics hotline).
216. Suzanne M. Crampton et al., The Informal Communication Network: Factors
Influencing Grapevine Activity, 27 PUB. PERSONNEL. MGMT. 569, 570 (1998)
(“Generally speaking, studies indicate that informal networks transmit messages faster
than formal ones. This means that information reaches its destination before formal
communication networks begin to communicate with employees. The characteristic of

1060

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

stressful to employees, freeing them up to discuss issues more openly. 217
Informal communications can also convey, in a very sincere and
tangible manner, management’s commitment to running an ethical
organization, and show how management structures their own conduct
in adherence to the organization’s ethical norms.218 Additionally,
engaging in this type of dialogue before a violation is reported through
formal compliance mechanisms increases the likelihood that a potential
legal or ethical violation can be remedied before it occurs or grows into
a larger or more widespread problem.
2. Integrate Compliance Functions
into Daily Business Practices
As noted by Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, formal compliance
programs can become easily decoupled from regular business affairs,
rendering them ineffective.219 Thus, in designing and implementing an
internal compliance program, care needs to be taken that the program is
integrated into the organization’s ongoing business affairs such that it
becomes an integral part of the organization’s identity and operations. In
this way, employees can be pushed to consider ethical and legal
ramifications as part of the standard decision-making process when
carrying out business functions.
An example of such an integrated policy, provided by Weaver,
Trevino, & Cochran, is a health care products company they examined.
The company made one-third of every manager’s annual raise
dependent upon how well the manager carried out ethical ideals, as
evaluated by superiors, peers, and subordinates.220 Such a policy helps
ensure that managers are considering ethics and compliance issues when
making decisions—their livelihood depends on it. In order to be
effective, integration need not be this formal, however. For example,
informal discussions with employees when making decisions can spur
employees to integrate ethics into their decision-making processes. A
routine dialogue of simple questions such as “How will this decision
affect the environment?”; How will this decision affect how the public
accuracy has also been researched. Studies attest that most information transmitted by
the grapevine is accurate.”).
217. See Verhezen, supra note 131, at 187–88.
218. See id.
219. See Weaver et al., supra note 126, at 539–41.
220. Id. at 541.
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thinks about our company?”; “Is this legal? Even if it is, is it right?”; or
“Am I proud of this decision? Would I be ashamed if my friends or
family knew about it?”, can help build ethical norms within an
organization.221 When employees know that the company culture
requires them to justify decisions along ethical dimensions as well as
more traditional business metrics, they will be more likely to
instinctually integrate these considerations into their thought processes.
CONCLUSION
The 2008 financial crisis created broad societal costs, some of
which stemmed from corporate fraud and malfeasance.222 The Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission formed by Congress determined that the
crisis was avoidable, and had strong criticisms for lax government
regulators.223 While a failure of government regulation should shoulder
some of the blame of the crisis, the individuals and organizations who
were the primary actors should shoulder the most. Apparently, the
“strong compliance systems set up under Sarbanes Oxley”224 by
companies were not able to prevent the behavior that led to this crisis. In
light of these failures and lack of strong evidence that internal
compliance programs are effective in deterring illegal conduct,225 the
criticisms that the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank will
undermine internal compliance programs ring hollow.
Rather, as laid out in this Article, evidence indicates that the
whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank have the potential to serve as
an incentive for companies to more effectively implement and enforce
their internal compliance programs and attempt to build more ethical
cultures.226 Internal compliance programs are an important regulatory
mechanism that can benefit both the organizations that utilize them and

221.
222.

Verhezen, supra note 131, at 192.
See, e.g., Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88
WASH. U. L. REV. 149, 158–59 (2010) (noting the difficulty in determining the exact
cost of bailout programs, but noting that some reports in the media had reported the cost
as high $5 trillion and $7 trillion, even before additional stimulus funds were used in
2009).
223. See Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/business/econ
omy/26inquiry.html.
224. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMM., supra note 11.
225. See supra discussion Part III.B.1.
226. See supra discussion Part III.B.1.
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society. However, like any regulatory framework, incentivizing internal
compliance has the potential for abuse. The whistleblower provisions of
Dodd-Frank provide a much-needed check on this potential for abuse,
while still respecting the valuable role that internal compliance
programs can serve.

